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I.

WHETHER SANDERSON AND FIRST SECURITY ENTERED
INTO A BINDING IMPLIED- IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT IS A JURY QUESTION .

In Utah "the determination of whether sufficient indicia of
an implied-in-fact promise exists is a question of fact for the
jury, . . . " Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd,, 771 P.2d 1033, 1044,
(Utah 1989) .
Other courts similarly hold that questions of employment
contract formation are questions of fact:
Generally, courts seek to enforce the actual understanding of the parties to a contract, and in so doing may
inquire into the parties' conduct to determine if it
demonstrates an implied contract.
"[I]t must be
determined, as a question of fact whether the parties
acted in such a manner as to provide the necessary
foundation for [an implied contract], and evidence may
be introduced to rebut the inferences and show that there
is another explanation for the conduct."
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211,
765 P.2d 373, 385 (Cal. 1988) (In Bank.) (citation omitted).
The general rule is that the determination whether in a
particular case a promise should be implied in fact is
a question of fact. Where reasonable minds may draw
different conclusions or inferences from undisputed
evidentiary facts, a question of fact is presented.
"[T]he very essence of [the jury's] function is to select
from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that
which it considers most reasonable." We believe that
reasonable persons could differ in the inferences and
conclusions they would draw from the [employer's]
published manual regarding disciplinary policy and
procedure. . . . The trial court therefore erred in
granting summary judgment on this issue.

1

Waaenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.f 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d
1025, 1038 (Ariz. 1985) (En Banc.) (citations omitted).
In its attempt to avoid the consequences of this universal
recognition

that

formation

of

an

implied-in-fact

employment

contract presents questions of fact, First Security misstates
facts.

First,

First

Security

repeatedly

asserts

Sanderson

"understood" there was no implied-in-fact contract between himself
and First Security.

This is not true.

The record reflects that

all Sanderson's testimony on this subject involved only his present
understanding at the time of his deposition; moreover, First
Security's counsel extracted that "understanding" only over the
repeated objection of Sanderson's counsel that those questions
impermissibly required Sanderson to make present legal conclusions
regarding the meaning of certain words.

(R. 174-75, 178-79).

Sanderson never testified he had any such understanding at any time
during his employment with First Security.
Second, First Security claims Sanderson acknowledged annually
in writing that he understood there was no contract between himself
and First Security.

Again, there is no foundation in the record

for this statement.

First Security refers only to two "Statement

of Compliance with Standards" forms signed by Sanderson.
238).

(R. 236,

Those forms say nothing about Sanderson's having any under-

standing regarding the nature of his employment contract with First
2

Security.

Moreover, PER-91, the referenced document detailing

those standards, addresses matters such as conflicts of interest,
outside

employment

and

political

contributions

(R.

236).

Sanderson's two statements that he was in compliance with such
standards have nothing to do with his employment-at-will status.
Third, First Security claims, at p. 6 of its Brief, that
Sanderson "concedes that there is nothing in OP 6-5.2 that insures
that the disciplinary guidelines are mandatory."

First Security

cites no authority for this statement, and there is none.

To the

contrary, Sanderson testified that in his experience First Security
had adopted OP 6-5.2 as a mandatory procedure to be followed in
terminating employees.

(R. 183-85, 187, 190, 196-97).

Finally, First Security materially misstates the record when,
at p. 7 of its Brief, it contends Sanderson's superior, Cummings,
did

not

specifically

assure

Sanderson

of

a

particular

job.

Cummings in fact specifically assured Sanderson that Sanderson
would keep Sanderson's job.

(R. 181-82, 186).

Particularly in light of these misstatements of material
facts, jury questions do exist regarding whether First Security
created a binding implied-in-fact contract with Sanderson either
through (1) its Manual; or (2) Cummings' oral assurances.

3

A.
First Security's Use Of The Word "Guidelines" Does Not Nullify
OP 6-5,2,
First Security repeatedly invokes the word "guidelines" as if
its use magically prevents the formation of an implied-in-fact
contract.

Several state supreme courts have addressed the use of

this word and have found it fails to have the automatic nullifying
effect suggested by First Security.
In

Foley,

the

California

Supreme

Court

considered

an

employer's "Termination Guidelines", which set forth a seven-step
pre-termination procedure.

In determining the employee had pled

a claim sufficient to go to the jury, the court held "an allegation
of breach of written termination Guidelines' implying self-imposed
limitations on the employer's power to discharge at will may be
sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of an employment
contract."

Id. at 388 (emphasis added).

In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich.
579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court addressed
a 250-page Supervisory Manual and 32-page Guidelines.
892, 905.

See id. at

The Michigan Supreme Court specifically held "that

employer statements of policy, such as the Blue Cross Supervisory
Manual and Guidelines, can give rise to contractual rights in
employees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that
the policy statements would create contractual rights . . . " and

4

"that the Blue Cross Manual and Guidelines of Personnel Practices
and Procedures establish contractual rights in [the plaintiff] to
be

disciplined

procedures

there

and

discharged

set

forth —

only

in

accordance

with

the

that the question of whether

termination of employment was in breach of the contract . . . was
also one for the jury."

Id. at 892, 895 (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d
725 (Ala. 1987), the Alabama Supreme Court held that the "language
used in [the employer's] handbook is clear enough that an employee
reading it could reasonably believe that, as long as he worked
within the guidelines set out in the handbook, he would not be
terminated until all procedures set out in the handbook had been
followed, including the reasons and circumstances for termination
in the handbook."

Id. at 736-37 (emphasis added).

Finally, in Wagenseller the Arizona Supreme Court addressed
an employee manual containing a four-step disciplinary procedure
similar to First Security's. That employer's manual contained the
following language: "These major infractions are not inclusive and
are only xguidelines' . "
added) .

Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis

The trial court concluded that the use of the word

"guidelines" was "to create, by its terms, no rights at all." Id.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding:
One reading the document might well infer that the
[employer] had established a procedure that would
5

generally apply in disciplinary actions taken against
employees. Although such a person would also note the
long list of exceptions, he might not conclude from
reading the list that an exception would apply in every
case so as to swallow the general rule completely. We
do not believe that the provision for unarticulated
exceptions destroys the entire articulated general policy
as a matter of law.
Id. (emphasis added) .

In short, there is no basis for First

Security's major premise that its use of the word "guidelines"
magically insulated it from, or disclaimed, contractual liability.
B.
OP 6-5.2 Is Mandatory As A Matter Of Law, Or Requires Jury
Interpretation.
The plain language of OP 6-5.2 further establishes it is
mandatory.

Its first clause reads:

"First Security follows the

Managing for Improvement Procedure . . . "

(R. 139), Addendum "C"

to Sanderson's initial Brief (emphasis added).
accept as authority, obey."
Dictionary (1985), p. 479.

Webster's

"Follow" means "to

Ninth New Collegiate

OP 6-5.2 (R. 139-41), Addendum "C"

(emphasis added) contains other mandatory language:
2. The Managing for Improvement Procedure is used
to deal with two distinct types of disciplinary problems
. . .
•

*

*

5.
Suspension/Terminations resulting from this
procedure are to be approved by the Division Subsidiary
Head Office.
•

*

•

6. In situations where employee behavior warrants
immediate termination, the stages of this process do not
need to be followed. Termination in these cases must be
approved by the appropriate division/subsidiary Head
Office.

6

Similarly, First Security's OP 6-5.4 (R.200) (emphasis added)
underscores the mandatory nature of OP 6-5.2:
1. The purpose of the [severance pay] is two-fold:
•

b.

*

*

To encourage management personnel to take
prompt action to terminate an employee whenever
s/he lacks the ability to perform the duties
of the position satisfactorily after the
Managing for Improvement Procedure has been
followed (refer to OP 6-5.2 for details).

In Campbell, the Alabama Supreme Court considered language
far more discretionary than the language of OP 6-5.2.

There, the

"constructive discipline" section of the employee handbook stated
that if "disciplinary action is necessary, it generally is taken
in [a specified] order" and that a four-step disciplinary process
"would generally be followed."
(emphasis added).

Campbell, 512 So.2d at 736 n.5

Despite the employer's argument that such

qualifications made the procedure discretionary, the Alabama court
held:

"The language used in this handbook is clear enough that an

employee reading it could reasonably believe that, as long as he
worked within the guidelines set out in the handbook, he would not
be terminated until all procedures set out in the handbook had
been followed, . . . "

Id. at 736-37 (emphasis added).

None of First Security's authorities is to the contrary.
Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1987),
involved

a

"sign-off"

sheet

expressly

7

acknowledging

that

employment was at will.

Id, at 973,

Moreover, the manual itself

in Dell contained an express disclaimer.

Sanderson signed no such

sheet, and First Security's Manual contains no disclaimer.

Dell

accordingly is nothing more than a disclaimer case, and of no
relevance to this appeal in light of First Security's claim at pp.
24-25 of its Brief that it makes no "disclaimer" argument in this
appeal.

Tolbert v. St. Francis Extended Care Center, 545 N.E.2d

384 (111. App. 1989), is similarly irrelevant because the policy
manual there established no specific procedures to be followed in
terminating an employee for substandard performance.

The Tolbert

court merely held that in the absence of specific procedures, a
manual may not constitute of an enforceable contract. JEd. at 386.
OP 6-5.2 provides specific procedures.

The manual in Butterfield

v. Citibank of S.D., N.A., 437 N.W.2d 857 (S.D. 1989), provided
only that employees could be terminated "in appropriate instances"
without notice, and contained no "for cause only" limitation as
does OP 6-5.2.

Id. at 858-59.

Another of First Security's cases, Shah v. General Electric
Co. , 697 F.Supp. 946 (W.D. Ky. 1988) is silent on the specific
provisions of the employment manual at issue, but contains no
indication that it provided for any progressive discipline of the
nature set forth in OP 6-5.2.

Moreover, that opinion makes clear

that there was no provision in the manual that an employee could
8

be terminated only "for cause."
v.

Van

Porn

Co., 851

F.2d

Id. at 948. Similarly, in Mursch
990

(7th

Cir.

1988) the

court

specifically commented on "the lack of Na hierarchy of rules the
infraction of which could lead to discharge

. . . [and/or a

provision] that a discharge would be only for "just cause" ' ."
Id. at 996 (quoting and distinguishing Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124
Wis.2d 154, 165, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985)).

Finally, in Vancheri v.

GNLV Corp., 777 P.2d 366, 368 (Nev. 1989), there was no employee
handbook, and it was unclear on appeal whether the disciplinary
procedure at issue even applied to the plaintiff.

Jd. at 369 &

n.2.
Obviously, First Security's statement, at p. 19 of its Brief,
that "Sanderson does not challenge the above authority" is wrong.
OP 6-5.2 is either mandatory as a matter of law, or, at the least,
requires jury interpretation.
C.
Enforceable Implied-In-Fact Employment Contracts Can Arise
Even In The Absence Of Specific Language.
As noted by the Foley court, if an employer "creates an
atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of
specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is
induced thereby to remain on the job those promises will be
enforced."

Foley, 765 P.2d at 384 (citation omitted).

Such an

"atmosphere" is sufficient to create an implied-in-fact contract

9

because "employers may benefit from the increased loyalty and
productivity that such agreements may inspire."

Id. at 387.

Accordingly, even if there is no express provision relied on by an
employee,
A limitation may be implied if, from all the circumstances surrounding the employment relationship, a
reasonable person could conclude that both parties
intended that the employer's . . . right to terminate the
employment relationship at-will had been limited by the
implied-in-fact agreement of the parties.
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Ida. 622, 778 P.2d 744, 746
(1989) (emphasis added) . Similarly, " [a]n implied-in-fact contract
term . . . is one that is inferred from the statements or conduct
of the parties."

Waaenseller, 710 P.2d at 1036 (emphasis added).

As summarized by Foley:
[T]he totality of the circumstances determines the nature
of the contract. Agreement may be "shown by the acts
and conduct of the parties, interpreted in the light of
the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances. "
Foley, 765 P.2d at 388 (citation omitted).
Consequently, Sanderson's contract with First Security is not
defined merely by First Security's simple insertion of the word
"guidelines".

Such automatic nullification of an implied-in-fact

employment contract would leave nothing of Berube.

An employer

could merely choose to insert the word "guidelines" to prevent the
formation of an implied-in-fact contract.
protect

deserving

employees.

It would
10

Such a rule would not
only

punish

stupid

employers. Instead, the necessary inquiry is what First Security's
words and conduct implied, and what inferences the reasonable
employee would make from those words and conduct, based upon the
totality of the circumstances. Summary judgment was inappropriate,
and on remand this Court should direct the district court either
(1) that OP 6-5.2 is mandatory as a matter of law; or (2) that
nothing in the language of OP 6-5.2 prevented the formation of an
implied-in-fact employment contract.
D.
The "Disclaimer" Issue Was Fully Briefed Before The District
Court, And Was A Basis For Its Opinion: First Security Still Argues
Disclaimer In Its Brief.
Inexplicably, First Security states, at pp. 24-25 of its Brief
that it "does not rely on the statements [of its handbooks] as
disclaimers'." To the contrary, both First Security and Sanderson
addressed the disclaimer issue in their pleadings before the
district court.

(R. 67, 101, 124-25).

Moreover, four pages after First Security's disingenuous
statement that it does not rely on any statements in the Benefits
and Standards Handbooks as "disclaimers", it argues, at p. 29 of
its Brief, that "Sanderson knew from reading the Standards Handbook
periodically that he could be terminated at any time."

Not only

is First Security playing games with its employees, it is playing
games with this Court. First Security cannot make the "disclaimer"
issue go away by claiming in one breath not to rely on it while,
11

in the next, making an explicit disclaimer argument.

It is

unconscionable for First Security to try to remove the disclaimer
issue from this appeal so it can continue to enjoy the "increased
loyalty and productivity", Foley, 765 P.2d at 387, generated by
what it admits is an illusory disciplinary system.
The

authorities

in

Sanderson's

initial

brief

regarding

disclaimer are unchallenged. Because the district court considered
the disclaimer argument, and entered its summary judgment after
First Security's argument it had "disclaimed" the provisions of the
Manual, this Court should, on remand, specifically direct the
district court that none of the disclaimers relied on by First
Security is sufficient to nullify the implied-in-fact contract
created by the Manual and by Cummings' oral assurances.
II.

WHETHER CUMMINGS'
PROMISES OF CONTINUED
EMPLOYMENT CONSTITUTED AN ENFORCEABLE IMPLIEDIN-FACT CONTRACT IS A JURY QUESTION.

First Security addresses none of the authorities contained at
p. 24 of Sanderson's initial Brief which establish that whether
oral promises of continued employment by an employer constitute an
enforceable implied-in-fact contract are questions of fact for the
jury. Additionally, First Security misstates once again the record
on this appeal when it states, at pp. 7 and 26, that Cummings did
not specifically assure Sanderson of a particular job.

12

To the

contrary, Cummings specifically assured Sanderson that Sanderson
would keep Sanderson's job.

(R. 181-82, 186).

None of First Security's three authorities on this issue
defeats Sanderson's claim.

Braig v. Palace Co., 4 IER Cases 1264

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) involved a motion to dismiss, rather than a
motion for summary judgment.

It accordingly considered no facts.

Rather, the court simply held plaintiffs' action for wrongful
termination was barred by New York law "because this cause of
action is not available in the context of an at will employment
relationship."

Id. at 1265. Merritt v. Edson Express, Inc., 437

N.W.2d 528 (S.D. 1989) reached its result because the plaintiff was
not assured any particular position.
case, Sanderson was

assured

See id. at 530.

a particular

In this

position, his own.

Finally, in Peters v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 685 F.Supp. 411
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) the employee was discharged during a three-month
probationary period.

See id. at 412, 414.

Sanderson's authorities on this issue are also unchallenged,
and

his

employment

claims

that

created

Cummings' oral
a

binding

assurances

implied-in-fact

of

continued

contract

are

sufficient to present a triable issue of material fact for the jury
upon remand of this case to the district court.

13

III. THIS CASE PRESENTS THE PROPER OPPORTUNITY FOR
THIS COURT TO RECOGNIZE AT LEAST A LIMITED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.
At the time Berube was decided the existence of a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts had been
recognized by only "a few courts, most notably the California
intermediate appellate courts."

Berube, 771 P.2d 1033 at 1051

(Z immerman , J., concurring.)
Today, however, the supreme courts of the majority of Utah's
regional sister states have now recognized a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing (the "Covenant") in employment contracts.

See,

e.g. , Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789
(Alas. 1989); Wacrenseller, 710 P.2d at 1040 (Ariz.); Foley, 765
P.2d at 374, 389, 401 (Cal.); Metcalf, 778 P.2d at 748 (Idaho);
Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063, 1067
(1982); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370
(1987); Elliott v. Tektronix, Inc., 102 Or. App. 388, 796 P.2d 361,
365 (App. 1990) (citing, Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or. 220, 779 P.2d
1000 (1989), and Best v. U.S. Nat'l. Bank, 303 Or. 557, 739 P.2d
554 (1987)); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence In Wash., Inc., 112
Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298, 304 (1989) (En B a n c ) .
These cases generally establish that the Covenant does not
require an employer to terminate its employees only for good cause.

14

See, e.g., Waqenseller, 710 P.2d at 1040; Foley, 765 P.2d at 400
n.39:

"If such an interpretation applied, then all at-will

contracts would be transmuted into contracts requiring good cause
for termination, . . . "

Id.

This appeal does not arise, however, in a purely "at-will"
context.

First

Security

voluntarily

modified

the

at-will

relationship when it issued its Manual and when it implemented
certain employee benefits; that modified relationship is subject
to the Covenant. When an employer modifies the relationship, the
Covenant

then

requires

that

neither party

to

that modified

relationship do anything that will injure the right of the other
to receive its benefits.

See, e.g., Jones, 779 P.2d at 783;

Waqenseller. 710 P.2d at 1038; Metcalf. 778 P.2d at 749; Elliott,
796 P.2d 361; Baldwin, 769 P.2d at 303-04.
Based

upon

judicial

recognition

and

development

of the

Covenant in other jurisdictions, and the record before it, this
Court should specifically hold the Covenant applied to the contract
between Sanderson and First Security in at least two respects.
A.
The Covenant Requires An Employer To Treat Like Employees
Alike.
Throughout First Security's Brief it repeatedly argues that
OP 6-5.2 of its Manual is a meaningless document "which First
Security Leasing may follow at its discretion."
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First Security's

Brief pp. 20, 22.
arguments:

One court has paraphrased, and rejected, such

" [C]ourts have recognized, as we do, that all employee

handbooks are not simply Corporate illusion[s], "full of sound
. . . signifying nothing."
(citations

omitted).

'"

Similarly,

Campbell,
once

an

512 So. 2d at 729
employer

issues

a

personnel manual, it "cannot be free to only selectively abide by
it.

Having announced a policy, the employer may not treat it as

illusory."

Waqenseller, 710 P.2d at 1037-38 (citation omitted).

In this case, First Security not only claims the right to
apply OP 6-5.2 selectively, it in fact did so, picking and choosing
those employees who were afforded its protections.
109).

Sanderson, however, observed

First

(R. 91-92;

Security's

uniform

adherence to the termination procedures of the Manual, was told to
follow it, and used it in terminating an employee.

(R. 185; 189-

90).x
In the process of holding the Covenant prevents an employer
from impairing the right of employees to receive the benefits of
their employment agreements, the Alaska Supreme Court specifically

1

Sanderson's testimony is explicit and unambiguous that he
followed the procedures of OP 6-5.2 in terminating that employee,
John Hancock. First Security never disputes that Sanderson did in
fact follow OP 6-5.2 in terminating Hancock; instead, it evades the
point by stating only that Hancock "voluntarily terminated".
(R. 92). In fact, Sanderson's statement that he followed OP 6-5.2
in terminating Hancock is unrefuted.
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held that the Covenant requires an employer to treat like employees
alike.

See Jones, 779 P.2d at 789 n.6.

First Security's own pleadings and affidavits establish that
as a matter of corporate policy, First Security treats like
employees disparately, arbitrarily and capriciously.

On remand,

this Court should instruct the district court that in the event
the jury finds First Security did in fact treat like employees
differently, in an arbitrary manner, such conduct violated the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
B.
The Covenant Precluded First Security
Sanderson While, Or Because, He Was Sick,

From

Terminating

State supreme courts have specifically held that when an
employer terminates an employee because the employee had been sick,
or had used sick leave, those terminations violated the Covenant.
In Campbell, a case remarkably similar to this one, a six-year
employee began to experience health problems during the fourth year
of his employment.

Over the next few years he received treatment

at various hospitals and various diagnoses were made before a
correct diagnosis was finally made.

During the period of the

employee's sickness his work performance slipped, resulting in his
being informed that unless his performance improved, he would be
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terminated.2

See, Campbell, 512 So. 2d at 727.

The employer

claimed it terminated the employee based upon his deteriorating job
performance.

The employee contended that he had talked with his

supervisor about the employee's deteriorating health, and that his
supervisor advised the employee to "keep working".

Id.

In

affirming the jury's award of damages to the employee, the Alabama
Supreme Court held that the employer "violated this obligation [of
good faith and fair dealing] when it discharged Campbell for
unsatisfactory performance even though it was aware of his physical
inability to perform satisfactorily."

Id. at 738.

Sanderson's supervisor, Curamings, repeatedly advised Sanderson
during Sanderson's illness to take all the time he needed to
recuperate, that Sanderson had a lot of friends at First Security,
and that when Sanderson was ready to come back to work his own job
would still be there.

(R. 186-87).

Furthermore, Judd —
termination —

the person who effected Sanderson's

had the following exchange with Rob Garff, one of

the persons treating Sanderson:
[Garff]: Does he have the time that he can have the
leave of absence?

In this case, First Security never gave Sanderson an
unacceptable rating, and he was never put on probation as required
by OP 6-5.2.
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[Judd]: Well, frankly, he pretty much used up all the
time, but, he's been off a great deal during the past six
months • . .
* * *

[Judd]: But it is your recommendation that he stays away
from work, is that correct?
[Garff]: That's my recommendation that he have a leave
of absence.
(R. 206), Addendum

"D" to Sanderson's initial Brief.

Garff

indicated to Judd that Sanderson would need to be away from work
for an additional "couple of weeks" to "get himself together."
Sanderson was terminated the next working day, despite First
Security's actual knowledge that Sanderson was then unable to
perform satisfactorily, and despite Sanderson's entitlement to
additional sick leave.

Id.

On similar facts, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held an
employer violated the Covenant.

During a two-year period, the

employee was absent for eight weeks, and those absences created
serious work problems for the employer.

See Metcalf, 778 P.2d at

745.
The employee sued based, in part, upon the employer's breach
of the Covenant. The district court granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment, and the employee appealed.

In reversing the

district court's grant of summary judgment, one justice wrote:
The conduct of [the employer] in penalizing [the
employee] for becoming sick, and thereby utilizing the
sick leave benefits which she had accrued through her
labors and service, may, therefore, have constituted a
19

breach of the duty which [the employer] owed fairly in
and good faith to [the employee]. On the record in this
case, the dismissal of the cause of action for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must
be reversed because a jury question is presented as to
whether the covenant was breached.
Id. at 753 (Huntley, J., concurring).
In remanding this case to the district court, this Court
should similarly instruct the district court that if the jury finds
First Security terminated Sanderson, either (1) with knowledge he
was physically unable to perform satisfactorily; or (2) to penalize
him for becoming sick and consequently utilizing the sick leave
benefits which he had accrued through his labors and service, such
termination violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
IV.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES ARE A CONTRACTUAL
REMEDY: THE FORESEEABILITY OF SANDERSONyS
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR THE
JURY.

As First Security itself admits at p. 7 of its Brief, Cummings
made his assurances of continued employment to Sanderson "during
a period of time in which Sanderson was explaining to Cummings
[Sanderson's] concerns about his medical and emotional problems."
Accordingly,

First

Security

has

explicitly

recognized

that

Sanderson's mental distress damages were "reasonably contemplated
by the parties" at precisely the time Sanderson's implied-in-fact
contract arose.

Both Sanderson and First Security consequently

agree that Sanderson's damages were foreseeable.
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The only question presented, therefore, is whether Sanderson
is entitled to have a jury determine the amount of damages he
suffered as a consequence of his emotional distress.

Contrary to

First Security's naked assertion to the contrary, Sanderson is not
seeking emotional distress damages in tort.

Instead, the cases

cited at pp. 32-33 of Sanderson's initial Brief establish that
reasonably foreseeable damages are recoverable as contract damages,
and that questions of foreseeability and objective reasonability
are for the jury.
Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 362
N.W.2d 628 (1984) is not necessarily to the contrary. As noted by
that court, contract damages for mental distress are recoverable
at least in cases where the contract is made or meant to secure the
protection of personal interests. See id. at 630 n.19. Similarly,
Foaleman v. Peruvian Assoc, 127 Ariz. 504, 622 P.2d 63 (Ariz. App.
1980) specifically noted that emotional distress damages are
recoverable for breach of contract when the defendant "was aware
of the reasons . . . and that the failure of performance would,
under

the

circumstances,

consequences, . . ."

expose

plaintiff

to

particular

Id. at 65.

Finally, DeMarco v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134
(Fla. App. 1978) did not even address whether emotional damages can
be awarded in an action for a breach of employment contract.
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Rather, DeMarco

merely

affirmed

a dismissal, not

a

summary

judgment, on the grounds that the complaint failed to allege the
elements of a wilful independent tort.
already

specifically

held

that

This Court, however, has

mental

anguish

damages

are

recoverable in an appropriate breach of contract action, and that
foreseeability "will always hinge upon the nature and language of
the contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties." Beck
v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985) (emphasis
added).

See also, Berube, 771 P.2d at 1053

(Zimmerman, J.,

concurring) (noting that Beck is applicable to wrongful discharge
cases such as this).
On remand, this Court should direct the district court that
the foreseeability of Sanderson's emotional distress, the reasonability of his expectations, and the amount, if any, of his damages
for emotional distress

involve contract damages, and present

legally proper questions of fact for the jury.
V.

NONE OF FIRST SECURITY'S ARGUMENTS ARE RELEVANT
TO THE DEPOSITION FILING ISSUE: ITS FILING
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED,

All of First Security's argument regarding the filing of
depositions overlooks the fact that prior to January 15, 1990, no
rule permitted litigants to attach deposition pages to memoranda.
See (repealed) Rule 4-501(6), Utah Code of Judicial Administration
(superseded on January 15, 1990 by (current) Rule 4-501(1)(a))
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(former Rule providing that M[m]otions based upon depositions or
supported thereby shall not be heard unless the depositions are
filed . . ."; (superseded) Rule 2.7(d) Rules of Practice in the
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah and Rule
2(d), Rules of Practice-Third Judicial District (both superseded
by former Rule 4-501(6)) (to the same effect as former Rule 4501(6)).
All of First Security's argument consequently addresses a
different set of rules. Under those former rules, a party was not
authorized to attach deposition pages to a pleading, but was
instead affirmatively required to file the entire deposition with
the court.

On January 15, 1990, the procedure became reversed

—

filing was no longer automatically authorized, and deposition page
attachment to pleadings was authorized for the first time in Utah.
This Court has recently reaffirmed that it will not "consider
on appeal depositions that were not considered by the trial court,
. . . " See, Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095, 1096
n.2 (Utah 1990).

It is undisputed that the district court never

reviewed any parts of Sanderson's deposition other than those pages
attached to Sanderson's Memorandum (R. 161-96). The district court
erred when it permitted the filing of a deposition it had never
seen.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

In its Brief, First Security arrogantly takes the position
that an employer in the 1990 fs can instill the expectation of fair,
consistent and predictable discipline in its employees on the one
hand, while on the other secretly nullifying those expectations by
the use of a few magic words, most notably the word "guidelines".
Courts across the country have increasingly held that modern-day
employees are entitled to more:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent
upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our
people have become completely dependent upon wages. If
they lose their jobs they lose every resource except for
the relief supplied by the various forms of social
security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon
others for all of their income is something new in the
world. For our generation, the substance of life is in
another man's hands.
K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Nev. 1987) (citation
omitted) (emphasis provided by the Ponsock Court).

See also,

Foley, 765 P.2d 407 (Broussard, J. concurring and dissenting) ("a
job is status, reputation, a way of defining one's self-worth and
worth in the community"); W. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt
and the New Deal, 119 (1963) ("To be unemployed in an industrial
society is the equivalent of banishment and excommunication. A job
established a man's identity —

not only what other men thought of

him but how he viewed himself; the loss of his job shattered his
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self-esteem and severed one of his most important ties to other
men.")

Employees are not chess pawns.

First Security's Manual, its oral assurances to Sanderson, and
its course of conduct all gave rise to (1) Sanderson's justified
expectations of continued employment; and (2) a binding impliedin-fact employment contract between Sanderson and First Security.
That contract was subject to the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
On appeal, First Security no longer claims, as it did in the
district

court, that

it expressly

disclaimed

that contract.

Instead, it argues that it impliedly disclaimed the Manual's
mandatory provisions by calling them "guidelines".

Berube, other

applicable authorities, and sound policy permit no such result.
This Court should reverse and remand this matter to the district
court with instructions to conduct the requested jury trial on all
issues presented by this appeal.
DATED:

January

/#

1991.
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